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Abstract. 
   
In this debate with Lisa Feldman Barrett, I defend a view of emotions as biological 
functional states.  Affective neuroscience studies emotions in this sense, but it also 
studies the conscious experience of emotion (“feelings”), our ability to attribute emotions 
to others and to animals (“attribution”, “anthropomorphizing”), our ability to think and talk 
about emotion (“concepts of emotion”, “semantic knowledge of emotion”), and the 
behaviors caused by an emotion (“expression of emotions”, “emotional reactions”).  I 
think that the most pressing challenge facing affective neuroscience is the need to 
carefully distinguish between these distinct aspects of “emotion”.  I view emotion states 
as evolved functional states that regulate complex behavior, in both people and animals, 
in response to challenges that instantiate recurrent environmental themes.  These 
functional states, in turn, can also cause conscious experiences (feelings), and their 
effects and our memories for those effects also contribute to our semantic knowledge of 
emotions (concepts).  Cross-species studies, dissociations in neurological and 
psychiatric patients, and more ecologically valid neuroimaging designs should be used 
to partly separate these different phenomena.
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The neuroscientific investigation of emotion, affective neuroscience, is one of the most 
interesting and vibrant new disciplines, and of paramount importance for understanding 
individual differences and many psychiatric disorders.  It is also one of the most 
confusing disciplines, in large part because the word “emotion” is used in multiple ways.  
In this debate with Lisa Feldman Barrett, we will try to make it less confusing.  I begin 
with a bare-bones decription of my view (cf. Figure 1), then discuss how confusions 
arise, and conclude with some thoughts on how the neuroscientific investigation of 
emotions could move forward.  Since my focus is on how even to think about “emotion” 
as scientists, this article is light on reviews of empirical studies and heavier on 
conceptual material.  I aim here to present my own view as clearly as possible, and will 
reserve most of my comments on Lisa’s view for the rebuttal.
Affective neuroscience, and cognitive neuroscience more generally, requires a close 
interplay between the vocabularies and frameworks of two different scientific disciplines: 
psychology and neuroscience.  When they study emotions, these two disciplines are 
trying to describe the same states or processes (I use these terms interchangeably 
here), but often on the basis of different kinds of data, methods, and theories. Some 
views suppose one discipline has priority over the other, often that neuroscience trumps 
psychology:  if we can’t find evidence for a psychological construct from brain data, then 
the psychologists were wrong about that construct.  I want to resist such a view, in large 
part because we really have very little idea about how to interpret neuroscience data, so 
whatever evidence it does or does not provide for a psychological theory should be 
considered extremely preliminary.  So while I believe that emotions are brain states, I 
also believe that we need to begin by understanding them as psychological states.  
1.  What are emotions? Emotions are functional states, implemented in the activity of 
neural systems, that regulate complex behaviors.
My view of emotions begins with everyday observations and concepts (but it doesn’t 
end there).  Clear instances of an emotion state are those that Charles Darwin already 
noted in his book, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals [1].  That is, at 
least in the first instance, we attribute emotion states to people and to many other 
animals on the basis of their context-dependent observed behavior.  Emotion states, 
together with many other mental state attributions, provide causal explanations of 
behavior.  I take it that there is little disagreement that a weeping adult, a screaming 
child, and a hissing cat all are in various emotion states.  What exactly we want to call 
those states, and whether they should be thought of categorically or dimensionally, are 
further and more complicated questions.  For simplicity of exposition I will use words like 
“fear” to refer to the hissing cat in this paper, for example-- but the meaning of that term 
will likely need to be revised to be useful in a mature affective neuroscience.  It is also 
the case that the sets of stimuli and behaviors that specify an emotion’s functional role 
are highly context-dependent.  For instance, the cat’s hissing behavior by itself is also 
quite compatible with an emotion state of anger, rather than fear (or both) -- one would 
need to do experiments (challenging the animal with specific stimuli, observing its 
behavior) to disambiguate this, since the hissing is not unique to fear.  Likewise, the 
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weeping adult may be weeping from sadness, or anger, or some combination of these 
emotion states as we commonly conceive them-- we would need more information 
about their facial expression, their other behavior, and the circumstances in which the 
behavior is observed.  This applies to most emotional behaviors: they help narrow down 
the set of possible emotion states that explain the behavior, but we typically require 
considerable additional information about the history and circumstances under which 
the behavior is exhibited to disambiguate between multiple possible emotion states that 
could account for the behavior.  We do this all the time: if somebody is behaving in a 
way indicative of an emotion state, we usually probe them further to get additional 
evidence (for instance, by asking them how they feel, or what happened, or what they 
intend to do).  The context-dependency of emotion states is also critical to consider for 
affective neuroscience studies in which we want to experimentally manipulate emotion 
states.
If the above simple starting point is a reasonable place to begin to develop a scientific 
concept of emotion states, the next question is what it is about these examples -- the 
weeping person, screaming child, or hissing cat-- that distinguish them as evidence for 
emotion states.  All behaviors are caused by central states of various kinds: so what 
distinguishes emotion states?  A useful comparison is with behaviors that are either 
simpler or more complex.  Reflexes are simpler than emotional behaviors.  Reflexes are 
relatively rigid and typically do not interface in a rich way with other psychological 
states-- they do not need to interact with attention or memory, for instance.  They just 
connect sensory inputs to motor outputs (the reality is more complicated, but let’s 
simplify for the sake of the examples).  So emotions are more complex than reflexes, 
they “decouple” stimuli from responses, thus affording much more flexibility [2].  
Planned, volitional behavior, on the other hand, is more flexible and more complex than 
emotions.  Emotional behaviors are not like that either -- they don’t have that many 
degrees of freedom.  Emotions regulate behavior at a level of complexity intermediate to 
that of reflexes and volitional behavior [3].  Charles Darwin had a similar notion in mind 
when he wrote about emotional behaviors, “Nor can these movements in the dog be 
explained by acts of volition or necessary instincts, any more than the beaming eyes 
and smiling cheeks of a man when he meets an old friend.” [1]
In my view, then, emotion states evolved in order to allow us to cope with environmental 
challenges in a way that is more flexible, predictive, and context-sensitive than are 
reflexes, but that doesn’t yet require the full flexibility of volitional, planned behavior.  
They evolved to deal with particular, recurring themes in our environment; and because 
most of the specific sensory features of those themes are highly variable, they also 
critically involve learning.  Broadly, emotions are one solution to determining what is 
relevant in the world by learning recurring patterns-- themes, if you will.  In fact, I think 
that the patterns that emotions are tuned to are at the level of “core relational 
themes” [4], even if the specific relational themes that psychological theories have 
proposed so far may not be the right ones. This is a functional definition of emotion 
states (I use the term “functional” in the philosophical sense of functionalism, not in the 
developmental psychological sense.  A functionally defined term is defined by what it 
does rather than by how it is constituted.  Consequently animals with very different 
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brains -- and, in principle, even robots -- could nonetheless be in similar emotion 
states).  
Building on the comments above, we can begin to list the properties that emotion states 
exhibit, which psychological theories of emotion have often attempted to do, and which 
my colleague David Anderson and I have also attempted [5].  Figure 2 summarizes 
some of these in a provisional list.  One universally recognized feature of emotions is 
that they can be related to one another in a similarity space.  The simplest such space 
has two dimensions (perhaps corresponding to something like valence and arousal), 
although we will need additional dimensions to capture all the varieties of emotions.  
Fairly discrete clusters of emotion instances in this space would then correspond to 
specific emotion categories.  Another prominent feature of emotion states is their 
flexibility, which derives from their “decoupled” nature: they are central states that 
persist for some time, and so can accumulate a host of contextual information before 
triggering behavioral decisions.  The persistence of an emotion state also permits it to 
interface in a rich way with the rest of cognition, a major topic of study [6, 7].  Given the 
multiple causal effects of an emotion state, these need to be coordinated in some way, 
another feature that is frequently emphasized in psychological theories of emotion (and 
one that, for me, is strong evidence for a central emotion state that does the 
coordinating).  Finally, emotion states have prepotent control over behavior, a feature 
similar to historical schemes of an “interrupt” mechanism that can terminate ongoing 
goal-directed behavior when a sudden environmental challenge is encountered [8].  All 
of this is of course further complicated in adult humans, since there is some degree of 
volitional control over emotion states and their expressions.  Emotion regulation and 
strategic/deceptive signaling through emotional expression are perhaps the most 
distinctively human aspects of emotion. 
The features of emotion states sketched in Figure 2 are relatively domain-general, but 
in their combination provide clues to the domain-specific roles that guided the evolution 
of particular emotions.  The way that many of the features are engaged relative to 
specific stimuli and behaviors will demarcate emotion categories.  For instance, 
conditioned taste aversion or Pavlovian fear conditioning both involve learning (by itself 
a domain-general feature), but they apply to specific kinds of stimuli-- not just any 
stimulus can be conditioned in this way, and not just any behavior can be produced 
(only those stimuli, and behaviors, relevant to dealing with threats and to avoiding 
poisonous foods, in this example).  In many cases, the possible functional roles that an 
adult human emotion can play are enormous, so I believe that we should begin the 
investigation by identifying the core functional roles that specify the emotion category. 
This is one reason that developmental and comparative data are essential.  They can 
give us some hints as to what the functional relations are that guided the evolution of 
the emotion -- this is the ultimate functional story we would want to know: what 
functions, in our ancestral environment, did an emotion play that resulted in the 
selection of neural mechanisms to implement that function?  Evolutionary psychology 
tries to provide precisely such functional accounts of emotion states [9], including not 
only accounts for emotions like fear and disgust, but also for social emotions: these 
serve functional roles in regulating our social behavior [10].  One exciting approach in 
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affective neuroscience could be to design experiments that engage functional roles for 
specific emotions as hypothesized by theories from evolutionary psychology. 
I think many of the attributes of emotion states, and the functional conception of them 
that I am advocating, would put me in the “Basic Emotion” camp, even though I would 
disagree with many other details of certain Basic Emotion theories.  By “basic” I mean 
“biologically basic” [11], that is, a category defined in an evolutionary sense.  I take it 
that this is also the sense in which psychologists like Ekman [12] have used the term, 
and the sense in which neurobiologists like Panksepp [13] have used the term (although 
they posit different sets of basic emotions).  Basic Emotion theorists typically have not 
only a list of the specific features an emotion must satisfy in order to count as basic 
(e.g., culturally universal, specific physiological profile, etc.) but also supply their 
inventory of the particular basic emotions (e.g., happiness, fear, anger, etc.).  While I 
think that we can indeed begin to list features (cf. Figure 2), I am reluctant to actually 
name a list of emotions, because I do not think we have enough data yet to do this 
(especially cross-species data), and because the words for emotions that already exist 
are likely to be misleading.  I also see no reason why a specific emotion category could 
not also be represented in a dimensional space (discrete and dimensional ways of 
describing emotions seem complementary).  
There is a lot of work to be done in order to figure out the functional role of different 
emotions, and in order to come up with the best categories and/or dimensions by which 
to characterize the different emotion states.  But I think we also have a lot of data 
already that points the way for how best to parse emotions.  Some of those data are 
from psychological studies in humans, some from behavioral studies in animals, and 
some from neuroscience studies in both species.  Perhaps the best place to start, if one 
wanted to begin neuroscientific studies of a specific emotion, would be to pick an 
emotion on which there is a fair amount of evidence across all these different sources.  
Emotion categories like anger, fear or disgust seem particularly well suited, for example.  
2.  How to get confused about emotions.
Affective neuroscience can be confusing when it fails to make distinctions between 
different aspects of affective processing.  The titles of papers and discussions that 
authors give are often no help here either, since they frequently conflate different 
meanings of the term “emotion”.  The most common ambiguity is between “emotion” as 
conceived above (the functional state) and its conscious experience, conceptualization, 
or attribution.  Generally, when I am in a state of anger, I also feel angry, and I also think 
about being angry.  Those are all interesting processes to study, but they are distinct.  I 
am interested here, in the first instance, in how we should study “emotion states,” not 
“how people can use concepts to think about emotions”, or “how people make 
attributions of emotions,” or “how people can speak about emotions”.  Those are all 
further interesting questions, and certainly questions that affective neuroscience should 
investigate, but I don’t believe they are the place to start because they don’t help us to 
ground what emotions are supposed to be about in the first place.  
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Take again the example of my hissing cat.  The cat cannot speak about emotions, 
plausibly also cannot think about nor has a concept of what an emotion is, and it 
remains unclear how to determine if it would even have a conscious experience of an 
emotion, whatever one means by that exactly.  But it is clear to me that it has emotions 
(in the above functionally defined sense) -- this is what I attribute to the animal in order 
to explain and predict its behavior, and indeed it works fairly well most of the time.  The 
emotion states are the internal functional states that produce the behaviors we see. 
Colloquially, that is what we would say about the cat: it is in a “state of fear”.  Affective 
neuroscience investigations of these states would then study what it is in the brain of 
the hissing cat that causes those behaviors, in response to particular context-dependent 
stimuli.  Of course, there are many more subtle and mixed emotions than these blatant 
examples, as well as more sustained states that we would typically call moods, and 
there can be further debate about where to draw the line and say that we would no 
longer call a state an emotion state.  To anchor the investigation, however, I believe we 
need clear, strong emotion states evoked by ecologically valid stimuli, where 
“ecologically valid” simply means “experimentally re-creating the functional challenge 
that we hypothesize engages the emotion under investigation”.
Emotion states, then, are not the same as emotion concepts or emotion experiences.  
By analogy, if I wanted to study people’s concepts of planets, I could do psychological or 
neuroimaging studies to investigate this (I would study what people know and think 
about planets).  But if I want to study planets, I would do astronomy and use a 
telescope.  Just like concepts of planets are not planets, concepts of emotions are not 
emotions.  Emotion states are also not the same as conscious experiences of emotions.  
In this respect, the usage of the word “emotion” that I am advocating is similar to how 
we use words like “vision” or “memory” in neuroscience.  For the layperson, vision and 
memory are all about conscious experiences (seeing and remembering).  For the 
scientist they are functionally defined terms, and indeed we now know that both visual 
processing and memory can be non-conscious (as in blindsight and nondeclarative 
memory).  Our commonsense concepts for most mental-state terms seem to depend on 
our concept of conscious experience, but I think our scientific concepts for mental-state 
terms should not.  If they did, it becomes problematic how to study the minds of people 
and animals who cannot use language to tell us about their conscious experiences.  
Joseph LeDoux has correctly pointed out this problem: if we use the commonsense 
concept of “fear” when describing animal neuroscience, we risk confusing this with the 
attribution of a conscious experience of fear.  LeDoux concludes from this that we 
should stop using words like “fear” or “emotion” when doing animal neuroscience [14], 
but I think there is a simpler solution: do the same thing we as scientists do when we 
study vision or memory.  Use a scientific concept of “emotion states” that is not based 
on conscious experience.  
To summarize how people get confused about what is meant by “emotion”: there are 
distinctions between the functional emotion state (“the emotion state”), its conscious 
experience (“the experience of the emotion”), our ability to attribute emotions to others 
and to animals (“attribution of emotion”; “emotion perception”), our ability to think and 
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talk about emotion (“conceptualizing emotion”), and the behaviors caused by an 
emotion state (“the expression of emotions”, “emotional reactions”) (Table 1).  I think 
emotions are first and foremost about the first of these, and all the others are derivative 
(but no less interesting to study). 
3.  Dissociating emotion states from emotion concepts: An example from neuroscience.
An example of how emotion states can be separated from conceptual knowledge of 
emotions comes from classical cognitive neuropsychology, the use of neuroscience 
data in order to help make distinctions by showing dissociations [15].  The famous 
patient S.M. [16], who has bilateral lesions to her amygdala, shows a dissociation with 
respect to fear that is about as good as dissociations get.  She can laugh, she can cry, 
and she can endorse feelings of happiness and sadness and most other emotions.  But 
she does not show any of the effects of a state of fear that we would normally use in 
order to attribute fear [17].  She does not show normal avoidant behaviors to 
threatening situations, she does not show autonomic responses or give subjective 
ratings of fear to normally fear-inducing stimuli, and she fails to show learning based on 
unconditioned fear in Pavlovian fear conditioning.  A subset of the same deficits (minus 
the subjective ratings and with simpler behaviors) is seen in animals with bilateral 
amygdala lesions [18].  
Despite the complete failure to induce a state of fear from any external stimuli, S.M. can 
tell us a lot about fear.  She has read books and watched movies in which fear occurs, 
she has spoken with other people about fear, and she even has autobiographical 
memories of feeling afraid as a child (plausibly before her amygdala was fully lesioned) 
[16, 17].  Consequently, she has accumulated an impressive store of semantic 
knowledge about fear, so much so that we should say that she has a concept of fear.  
She can tell you that people who are afraid scream and run away; she can tell you that 
being chased by a bear would make you afraid; she can use the word “fear” 
appropriately in conversation.  But she herself does not instantiate the state of fear, 
even though she has so much conceptual knowledge about fear. Just having the 
concept of fear is typically insufficient for the state of fear.  In fact, it is extraordinarily 
difficult to induce an emotion state by just activating the concept of an emotion.  If it 
were easy, depressed people would just need to think about being happy and they 
would be happy.
In humans, the routes by which a state of fear can be induced are of course 
considerably more varied than in other animals, and include memories and imaginings 
in addition to actual occurent sensory stimuli.  Indeed, if I think hard about situations in 
which I would be afraid, I feel a little bit afraid.  So conceptual representations of 
emotions do have some effect at least on the conscious experience of emotions, and 
presumably on the emotion state as well.  Conversely, being in an emotion state 
typically also causes conceptual representations of emotions.  If you are in a state of 
fear, you typically also think about fear and believe you are in a state of fear.  So 
another important challenge for affective neuroscience is to detail the causal 
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interactions between emotion states, emotion experiences, and emotion concepts: 
usually, all three occur together.  
There is a final important dissociation that patient S.M. showed us.  As with the case of 
memory, where H.M. showed us how declarative and nondeclarative memory can be 
dissociated, S.M. has also shown us that fear to external stimuli, and panic to 
interoceptive stimuli, can be dissociated.  S.M. does panic if she feels like she is 
suffocating (elicited in the experiment through inhaling carbon dioxide [19]).  This was a 
very interesting advance, and showed us that our scientific concept of fear needs finer 
distinctions, just like H.M. and many studies since then have given us a more fine-
grained taxonomy of memory.  So the case of S.M. shows us three different 
dissociations relevant to affective neuroscience: that the state of fear can be dissociated 
from other emotion states; that the state of fear can be dissociated from its concept; and 
that there are varieties of fear, to which we may want to give separate names (anxiety, 
fear, and panic have all been used already, and there may be additional varieties that 
function with respect to specific types of threat [20]).  
4.  A framework for neuroimaging studies of emotion states: systems, hierarchy and 
topography.
Explaining how an emotion state is implemented in the brain requires us to explain 
which structures, at which point in time, implement particular computations.  That makes 
it nonsensical to ask if “fear is in the amygdala”, for example, since the state is 
distributed in both space and time. Nonetheless, we can say that the amygdala is one 
component of the neural system for fear, and moreover a necessary component.  At the 
coarsest level, we know there’s something happening in somebody’s brain for the 
several seconds or minutes they are in a state of fear.  At the most microscopic level, 
we know there are causal events, each at the millisecond scale, across billions of 
neurons.  The first description is too low dimensional; the second is too high 
dimensional.  So the challenge to the neuroscientist is: can you find something useful in 
the middle, something at the level of neural systems, that eventually allows us to 
understand how emotions link stimuli to behavior (and other cognitive states).
Figure 2 can motivate initial hypotheses here.  As already noted, one prominent and 
universally acknowledged feature of emotions is that they have a similarity structure. 
Anger and fear are more similar than anger and happiness, for example.  Similarity 
relationships are often partly captured in a two-dimensional space of valence and 
arousal.  These facts motivate the hypothesis that there should be topography in how 
emotions are instantiated in the brain.  Indeed, studies in rodents have argued for a 
topography in the nucleus accumbens that maps the dimension of valence [21], at least 
with respect to feelings.  One challenge in discovering topography is that we will need a 
better description of the dimensional space that defines similarity relations among 
emotion states.  On the other hand, semantic knowledge for emotions has indeed been 
mapped, at least across cortex, and can be compared to semantic knowledge of many 
other concepts for which we have words [22].  Another study [23] was notable for 
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comparing similarity amongst neural representations with conceptual similarity in how 
people rate emotions according to several popular psychological theories (arousal/
valence; basic emotions; appraisal dimensions).  That study [23] found that attributions 
about other people’s emotions that we make from thinking about the situations in which 
people find themselves activate representations in a system of brain structures known 
to be involved in mental state attribution more generally (such as the temporoparietal 
junction, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and precuneus); the best match between neural 
and psychological similarity structures held for ratings on appraisal dimensions.  These 
recent examples use techniques that would likely be useful also to investigate how 
emotion states (functionally defined) might be topographically represented in the brain 
(voxel-based modeling [22], and representational dissimilarity analysis [23], 
respectively).
Another reasonable hypothesis derives from the hierarchical coordination that emotion 
states achieve.  In this respect, they feature what Tinbergen already observed in the 
fixed action patterns many animals exhibited [24].  Some neurobiological studies, 
especially in rodents, have produced very detailed knowledge of certain components of 
an emotion state; for instance, optogenetic activation of specific neuronal populations in 
the hypothalamus can produce  directed aggressive behavior in mice [25].  The next 
question is: what are the inputs to these hypothalamic neurons that would normally 
orchestrate this behavioral component?  The coordination amongst many components 
requires a hierarchical control of sorts, and we could test whether this is accomplished 
by yet a separate component, or whether it arises from network dynamics amongst all 
the pieces.  This is basically what systems neuroscience is already doing: studying 
specific components of an emotion, and trying to figure out how they are connected to 
produce all the features of an emotion.  Such systems-level studies of emotions in 
animals try to choose ecologically valid situations to induce emotion states like fear, or 
try to dissect specific components of such states, like fear learning in Pavlovian fear 
conditioning.   
So we have some promising examples of topography in human fMRI studies that were 
not about actual emotion states but instead about concepts; and from the components 
of actual emotion states but studied in animals.  By contrast, there have been very few 
neuroimaging studies in humans that have attempted to actually induce real emotions in 
human subjects, and fewer still that have attempted to dissociate them from 
experiences or conceptual processing of emotions.  Nonetheless, there have been a 
handful of important imaging studies, ranging from early ones with PET [26] to later 
ones with fMRI [27, 28], that derive conclusions about particular brain structures 
involved in processing emotions from trying to induce actual specific emotion states 
(through autobiographical recall of emotional events, fear of electric shock, or with 
innately emotion-inducing stimuli like tarantulas, respectively). Those studies have 
focused on brain structures mostly distinct from the cortical regions emphasized in 
studies of semantic representation or mental state attribution.  They have instead 
emphasized subcortical structures like the amygdala, hypothalamus, and 
periaqueductal gray, much as have the studies of emotion states in animals (as well as 
additional cortical regions such as ventromedial prefrontal cortex and insula).  All of 
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these regions have also been noted in human and animal lesion studies, and have been 
the material for several influential neurobiological theories of emotion [29, 30].  
It is worth noting that our knowledge from fMRI studies of the neural regions encoding 
information about aspects of emotions has only emerged in the last few years.  Initial 
meta-analyses [31] searching for “basic” emotion representations had little success, no 
doubt in good part because the studies used for the meta-analysis were underpowered, 
univariate, and mixed many different aspects of “emotion”.  That has changed with 
general increase in sensitivity of fMRI studies and the widespread adoption of 
multivariate analyses, developments that produced evidence for dimensional 
components of core affect like valence [32], and, more recently, indeed found evidence 
for basic emotion representations [33], conclusions replicated also in meta-analyses of 
studies on emotion categories [34]. The rarity of human studies that have actually 
produced strong emotion states, and the frequent conflation of emotion states, 
concepts, and feelings, all suggest that it is far too early to say much about emotion 
states on the basis of neuroimaging data.  On the other hand, there is a wealth of data 
from animal studies, and there are lesion dissociations in humans, both of which help to 
motivate strong hypotheses about where to look in the brain, once we figure out how to 
design good neuroimaging studies of emotion states.
So to what extent can we in fact dissociate the functional emotion state from emotional 
experience, labeling, or concepts?  We could probably minimize the latter two under 
experimental conditions that prevent reflective processing, or by imaging children or 
patients with certain kinds of brain damage.  I don’t know how to dissociate emotional 
experience from the functional emotion state, but that is a problem faced also by all 
studies that want to isolate the neural correlates of conscious experience [35].  A 
principal challenge will be to construct ecologically meaningful situations that can induce 
strong and well-characterized emotion states in the scanner environment.  Specific 
hypotheses about the functional roles that particular emotions play, perhaps informed by 
work in evolutionary psychology and ecology, would be needed to design the best 
experiments.  The ideal (difficult) project would design a series of experiments across 
different species to study, for instance, how the induction of fear across rodents, 
monkeys, and humans might engage both overlapping neural systems as well as 
components unique to a particular species.  More realistically, we could design human 
neuroimaging studies that contrast different emotions (or attempt to discover 
distinguishable subtypes of what we currently think of as one category of emotion), 
while also varying the level of associated conceptual processing.  This would still 
generally produce results that speak equally to emotion states and emotion 
experiences, but one cannot dissociate everything at the outset.  The recommendations 
for the affective neuroscientist using fMRI are threefold: (1) partly disentangle the neural 
correlates of emotions from all the other processing with which they interact; (2) 
carefully distinguish what aspect of “emotion” it is you are investigating (states, 
experiences, concepts); (3) construct hypotheses derived from knowledge of the 
functional features of emotions (Figure 2) and investigate these with the most sensitive 
neuroimaging methods. 
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As an affective neuroscientist, I would want a framework for investigating emotion that 
lets me investigate emotions not only in healthy adult humans, but also in rats, in people 
who cannot talk, and in people who are deluded about what emotion they have.  I would 
even want to be able to say something to engineers who might want to construct robots 
that have emotions.  An operationalization of emotions as functional states lets me do 
all of these, whereas a focus on emotion experiences, or emotion concepts, does not.  
Again, all useages of the word “emotion” are interesting to study, and it may well turn 
out that emotion states, emotion experiences, emotion concepts, and emotion 
attributions are all related in interesting ways, and that they share neural substrates.  
But that needs to be an empirical result, not something we conflate in our research 
program at the start.  
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Table 1.  Some examples of different aspects of emotion investigated in affective 
neuroscience, and my opinion about how central they are to a functionally defined 
emotion state.
Aspects of processing that are central to an emotion state.
 - emotion-cognition interactions [6, 7]
 - emotional learning and memory [36]
 - eliciting strong emotions with ecological stimuli [19, 28]
Aspects of processing that are less central to an emotion state.
 - perceiving emotional social signals (emotion perception) [37]
 - inferring emotions in other people (social inference, theory of mind) [23, 38]
 - semantic processing about emotions (concepts) [22]
 - lexical processing about emotions (words) [39]
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Figure 1.  Rate your position.  Which applies to emotions?  Indicated are my own, my 
take on Lisa Barrett’s [40, 41] and my take on Jaak Panksepp’s [13], to provide three 
different views (any errors are of course mine).  Many of the terms have unclear 
meanings, and the figure is intended only to give a rough starting point for discussions, 
not to quantify theoretical frameworks.  Lisa saw a prior version of this figure and sent 
some corrections to my original take on her view.  My original depictions of her positions 
are indicated by circles; the corrected positions from Lisa are denoted by triangles.
   Not at all      Very much so
Modular.  
Localized.
Distributed.
Cortical.
Subcortical.
Innate.
Acquired.
Domain-general.
Domain-specific.
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Figure 2.  Features of an emotion.  These features begin to describe functional 
properties of emotions, some of which may help define dimensions or categories of 
emotions in a mature theory of emotion.  Several of these are modified from [5].
Scalability: An emotion can scale in intensity, often conceived 
of as an arousal dimension in many psychological theories.  
Parametric increases in the intensity of an emotion can recruit 
discrete behaviors, such as the transition from hiding to fleeing 
during the approach of a predator.
Valence: A dimension to which Darwin referred in his “Principle 
of Antithesis”, valence is thought by many psychological 
theories to underlie an essence for emotion, often termed “core 
affect”.  Whereas scalability describes one fundamental aspect 
of behavior (whether to behave at all, and how vigorously), 
valence describes a second fundamental aspect: whether to 
approach or to withdraw.
Persistence: An emotion state outlasts its eliciting stimulus, 
unlike reflexes, and so can influence cognition and behavior 
(and other emotions) for some time.
Learning: While some stimuli innately induce emotions, the 
emotional significance of the vast majority of stimuli needs to be 
learned.  Pavlovian fear conditioning and conditioned taste 
aversion would be two examples (for fear and disgust, 
respectively) that are well studied in the lab.
Priority over behavioral control: Emotions are prepotent in 
their control over behavior, requiring additional regulatory 
mechanisms to override their behavioral expression.
Poised for social communication: Emotional behaviors in 
most animals are typically honest signals of states that predict 
behaviors.  As such, they have been co-opted as signals of 
which others can take advantage (conspecifics as well as 
predators and prey).
Hierarchical behavioral control: As Tinbergen first observed, 
many behaviors come as packages that can be controlled 
hierarchically.  Emotions implement their effects in this way.
Multi-component effects: Most psychological theories 
emphasize that emotional behaviors consist of multiple 
components, all of which need to be coordinated.  Emotion 
states accomplish this coordination.
Similarity structure
Flexibility
Coordination
Automaticity
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